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Abstract
We explore issues of dynamic supply and demand in ride sharing services such
as Lyft and Uber, where demand fluctuates over time and geographic location.
We seek to maximize social welfare which depends on taxicab locations, passenger
locations, passenger valuations for service, and the distances between taxicabs and
passengers. Our only means of control is to set surge prices, then taxicabs and
passengers maximize their utilities subject to these prices.
We study two related models: a continuous passenger-taxicab setting, similar to the
Wardrop model, and a discrete (atomic) passenger-taxicab setting. In the continuous
setting, every location is occupied by a set of infinitesimal strategic taxicabs and a
set of infinitesimal non-strategic passengers. In the discrete setting every location
is occupied by a set of strategic agents, taxicabs and passengers, passengers have
differing values for service.
We expand the continuous model to a time-dependent setting and study the corre-
sponding online environment.
The utility for a strategic taxicab that drives from u to v and picks up a passenger
at v is the surge price at v minus the distance from u to v. The utility for a strategic
passenger at v that gets service is the value of the service to the passenger minus
the surge price at v.
Surge prices are in passenger-taxicab equilibrium if there exists a min cost flow that
moves taxicabs about such that (a) every taxicab follows a best response, (b) all
strategic passengers at v with value above the surge price rv for v, are served and (c)
no strategic passengers with value below rv are served (non-strategic infinitesimal
passengers are always served).
This paper computes surge prices such that resulting passenger-taxicab equilibrium
maximizes social welfare, and the computation of such surge prices is in poly time.
Moreover, it is a dominant strategy for passengers to reveal their true values.
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We seek to maximize social welfare in the online environment, and derive tight
competitive ratio bounds to this end. Our online algorithms make use of the surge
prices computed over time and geographic location, inducing successive passenger-
taxicab equilibria.
1 Introduction
In the sharing economy1 individual self-interested suppliers compete for customers.
According to PWC, the sharing economy is projected to exceed 300 billion USD
within 8 years. Lyft and Uber are prime examples of such systems. According to
[16, 11] it is the users who gain the majority of the surplus from such systems, and
significantly so. Contrawise, many studies suggest negative societal issues in the
sharing economy (e.g., see [20, 12, 21, 3]).
Unlike salaried employees of livery firms, drivers for Uber (and other “gig” suppliers)
are free to decide when they are working and what calls/employment to accept.
E.g., drivers can refuse to accept a call if it is too far away. To increase supply (and
reduce demand) Uber introduced “surge pricing” which is a multiplier on the base
price when demand outstrips supply. The surge price can be different at different
locations.
In the past pricing schemes resulted in what was theorized to be negative work
elasticity [6]. In their work it is suggested that drivers impose upon themselves
“income targets”. This means that drivers will work until they reach their target
income for the day causing them to extend their hours in times of low payouts.
Recent studies suggest that this is false, surging prices in times of peak demand
seems to conjure positive work elasticity [8], allowing supply and demand to balance
more efficiently.
1.1 Network Model, Surge Pricing, Utility, and Passenger-
Taxicab Equilibria
Our goal is to maximize social welfare, defined as the sum of valuations of the users
serviced by taxicabs, minus the cost associated with providing such service. We do
so by setting surge prices (one per location), and let the system reach equilibrium.
Our surge pricing schemes have several additional features such as envy freeness.
We consider two related settings:
• A continuous setting where supply and demand consist of infinitesimal quanta,
supply and demand are modeled as fractional quantities at locations. This is
analogous to the non-atomic traffic model used in Wardrop equilibria [24].
– Here we assume that the taxicabs are strategic and respond to changing
surge prices whereas passengers are non-strategic so that demand is in-
sensitive to price (alternately, one may view these passengers as having
high value for service).
1Also known as the “gig” economy.
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– The cost for a taxicab at location x to serve a customer at location y is
the distance from x to y.
– Our goal here is to set a surge price rx at every location x so as to
incentivize taxicabs to act in a way that maximizes social welfare, i.e.,
all possible demand is serviced while the sum of distances traversed is
minimized.
• A discrete setting where both taxicabs and passengers are strategic, and every
taxicab and passenger is associated with some location.
– In this setting both demand and supply may change as a function of the
surge price. Every passenger has a value for service and every taxicab has
a cost for service at a given location, e.g., the distance to the location.
– Our goal here is to maximize social welfare (the sum of the values for the
served customers minus the sum of costs of the taxicabs to do so).
– At every location x, we set a surge price rx, that incentivizes taxicabs to
serve passengers in a manner that maximizes social welfare.
– Moreover, maximizing social welfare is not only in equilibrium but also
envy free.
– Every passenger at x whose value is strictly greater than rx is served, and
no passenger at x with value strictly less than rx is served.
We define the utility for a taxicab at x to serve a passenger at y as the surge price
at y, ry, minus the distance from x to y. A passenger at x with value v has utility
v − rx to be served by a taxicab, and utility zero if she takes no taxicab. Clearly, a
passenger at x with v − rx < 0 will refuse to take a taxicab.
We introduce the notion of a passenger-taxicab equilibria, for both continuous and
discrete settings. A flow is a mapping from the current supply to some new supply.
A flow has an associated cost which is the sum over edges of the flow along the
edge times the length of the edge. A flow f is said to be a min cost flow that maps
the current supply to the new supply if it achieves the minimal cost for moving the
current supply to the new supply (this cost is also called the min earthmover cost).
A passenger-taxicab equilibria consists of a vector of surge prices r = 〈rx〉, where rx
is the surge price at location x, current supply s = 〈sx〉, new supply s′ = 〈s′x〉 and
demand d = 〈dx〉, such that, for any min cost flow from s to s′, every taxicab and
every passenger maximize their utility. I.e., no taxicab can improve its utility by
doing anything other than following the flow, every passenger at x who has value
greater than rx is in dx and is served. Every passenger at x who has value less than
rx is not served.
The surge prices rx are poly time computable. In the continuous setting this is
polynomial in the number of locations, in the discrete setting this is polynomial in
the number of passengers and taxicabs.
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1.2 Maximizing Social Welfare in an Online Setting via Surge
Pricing
We consider an online setting based on the continuous setting, where the time pro-
gresses in discrete time steps. In each time step the following occurs: First, a new
demand allocation appears. Second, the online algorithm determines a new supply.
Given an allocation of supply and demand, the demand served at a location is the
minimum between the supply and demand at the location. The social welfare is the
difference between the total demand served and the total movement cost, summed
over all locations and time steps. The main new crux of our model is that the on-
line algorithm (principal) can not impose a new supply allocation, but is limited to
setting surge prices. If flow f is a flow equilibrium arising from these surge prices
— strategic suppliers follow flow f . Our results on surge prices for flow equilibria
imply that the online algorithm has flexibility in selecting the desired supply.
Trivially, for any metric, a simple algorithm that randomizes the start setting and
doesn’t move achieves a Θ(1/k) competitive ratio, where k is the number of locations.
However, If the costs of moving from any location to any other location is 1, we give
an optimal competitive ratio of Θ(
√
1/k). If the demand sequence has the property
that at any time and location the demand does not exceed 1/ρ (ρ ≥ 1), then we
show a tight competitive ratio bound of Θ(
√
ρ/k). For more general metric spaces
we show mainly negative results. Specifically, if all the distances are 1 + ǫ we show
that the competitive ratio is no better than (1 + ǫ)2/(ǫk), which implies an optimal
competitive ratio of Θ(1/k) for ǫ = Θ(1).
Another extension we consider is when the average difference between successive
demand vectors is bounded by δ (in total variation distance). In this case we show
that simply matching supply to the current demand gives a competitive ratio of
1 − δ and show that the competitive ratio can not be better than 1 − δ/4 (in the
case that all the distances are 1).
1.3 Related Work
It has been observed in taxicab services that a mismatch between supply and de-
mand, along with first-in-first-out scheduling of service calls, without restricting the
“call radius”, results in reduced efficiency and even market failure [1, 26]. This
happens because taxicabs are dispatched to pick up customers at great distance be-
cause no closer taxicab is currently available, more time is wasted traveling to pick
up clients, and the system performance degrades. Recent papers [9, 7] study how
changing surge prices over time allow one to avoid such issues. These papers do not
consider the issue of having geographically varying surge prices.
Assuming a stochastic passenger arrival rate, [2] uses a queue theoretic approach
to model driver incentives in the system. The paper considers a simplistic dynamic
pricing scheme, where there are two different pricing schemes for each node depend-
ing on the amount of drivers at said node. This model is compared to a simple flat
rate. Drivers are assumed to calculate their incentives over several rides. The paper
concludes that the dynamic pricing scheme can only achieve the welfare of the flat
rate. However, the dynamic pricing scheme allows for the manager to have more
room for error in calculating what the optimal rates are.
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A central problem in handling a centralized taxi system involves routing empty
cars between regions . Within the centralized mechanism, [5] shows that, assuming
stochastic arrival of passengers, an optimal static strategy (i.e., one that does not
change it’s routing policy based on current shortages) can be calculated by solving
a linear programming problem.
Recently, and independently, a similar problem was studied in [18]. In their model,
selfish taxicabs seek to maximize revenue over time. There is no explicit cost for
travel, one loses opportunities by taking long drives. They derive prices in equilibria
that maximize the sum of passenger valuations, but ignore travel costs. In contrast,
we ignore the time dimension and focus on the passenger valuations and travel costs.
Competitive analysis of online algorithms [23, 22, 15] considers a worst case sequence
of online events with respect to the ratio between the performance of an online
algorithm and the optimal performance. In a centralized setting, task systems, [4],
can be used to model a wide variety of online problems. Events are arbitrary vectors
of costs associated with different states of the system, and an online algorithm may
decide to switch states (at some additional cost). A strategic version of this problem,
for a single agent, was considered in [10] where a deterministic incentive compatible
mechanism was given. The competitive ratio for incentive compatible task system
mechanisms is O(1/k) where k is the number of states. We cannot use the incentive
compatible task system mechanisms from [10] for two reasons: (1) in our setting
there are a large number of strategic agents (many Uber drivers) split amongst a
variety of different [task system] states (locations) rather than one such agent in a
single state, and (2) the suppliers have both profits (payments) and loss (relocation).
Competitive analysis of the famous k-server problem [19] has largely driven the
field of online algorithms. A variant of the k-server problem is known as the k-
taxicab problem [13, 25]. Although the problem we consider herein and the k-
taxicab problem both seek efficient online algorithms, and despite the name, the
nature of the k-taxicab problem is quite different from the problem considered in
this paper. In the k-taxicab problem a single request occurs at discrete time steps
and a centralized control routes taxicabs to pick up passengers, seeking to minimize
the distances traversed by taxis while empty of passengers. Taxicabs are not selfish
suppliers, and all requests must be satisfied. This is quite different from our setting
where both demand and supply are spread about geographically, there are many
strategic suppliers, and not all demand must be served.
2 Model and Notation
2.1 The Continuous Passenger-Taxicab Setting
We model the network as a finite metric space G = (V,E), where ℓu,v ≥ 0 is the
distance between vertices u, v ∈ V . I.e., ℓu,v is the cost to a taxicab to switch
between vertices u and v. Infinitesimally small taxicabs reside in the vertices V .
Demand and supply are vectors in [0, 1]|V | that sum to one. Given demand d and
current supply s, we incentivize strategic taxicabs so that current supply s becomes
new supply s′ which services the demand d.
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If the demand in vertex u is du, and the new supply in vertex u is s
′
u, then the
minimum of the two is the actual demand served (in vertex u). Note that if the
two are not identical then there are either unhappy passengers (without service) or
unhappy taxicabs (with no passengers to service). Formally,
Definition 2.1. we define the demand served, as follows:
• The demand served in vertex u, ds(s′u, du), is the minimum of s′u and du, i.e.,
ds(s′u, du) = min(s
′
u, du).
• Given a demand vector d and a supply vector s′, the total demand served is
ds(s′, d) =
∑
u∈V ds(s
′
u, du) =
∑
u∈V min(s
′
u, du).
Switching supply from s to s′ is implemented via a flow f . A flow from s to s′ is a
function f(u, v) : V × V 7→ R≥0 that has the following properties:
• For all u, v ∈ V , f(u, v) ≥ 0.
• For all v ∈ V , ∑u∈V f(u, v) = s′v.
• For all u ∈ V , ∑v∈V f(u, v) = su.
We define the earthmover distance between supply vectors,
Definition 2.2. The cost of flow f is em(f) =
∑
u,v,∈V f(u, v)ℓu,v. The earthmover
distance from supply vector s to supply vector s′ is
em(s, s′) = min
flows f from s to s′
em(f).
We assume that switching supply from s to s′ is implemented via a flow f of minimal
cost. Note that there may be multiple flows with the same minimal cost — see
Figures 2 and 3.
In order to incentivize our strategic taxicabs to move to a new supply vector, we
use surge pricing in vertices.
Definition 2.3. Surge pricing is a vector, r ∈ R≥0, where rv is the payment to a
taxicab that serves demand in vertex v ∈ V .
We define the utility for an infinitesimal taxicab, given surge pricing r, as follows.
Definition 2.4. Given supply s, new supply s′, surge prices r, demand d, and a
min cost flow f from s to s′, the utility for a taxicab that switches from vertex u to
vertex v is
µ(u 7→ v|s′, r, d) = rv ·
(
ds(s′v, dv)
s′v
)
− ℓu,v.
To motivate the above definition of utility µ(u 7→ v|s′, r, d), of switching from u to
v, consider the following:
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• The probability of serving a passenger in vertex v is ds(s′v,dv)
s′v
. This follows
since:
– If passengers outnumber taxicabs in vertex v then any such taxicab will
surely serve a passenger.
– Alternately, if taxicabs outnumber passengers in vertex v then the choice
of which taxicabs serve passengers is a random subset of the taxicabs.
• The profit from serving a passenger in vertex v is equal to the surge price for
that vertex, rv.
• The cost of serving a passenger in vertex v, given that the taxicab was previ-
ously in vertex u, is ℓu,v.
Finally, we define the notion of a passenger-taxicab equilibrium, where no infinites-
imal taxicab can benefit from deviations.
Definition 2.5. Given a demand vector d, current supply vectors s, and new supply
s′, we say that a surge pricing r is in passenger-taxicab equilibrium, if for every min
cost flow f from s to s′, for every u, v ∈ V such that f(u, v) > 0 we have that
µ(u 7→ v|s′, r, d) = max
w∈V
µ(u 7→ w|s′, r, d). (1)
I.e., every infinitesimal taxicab is choosing a best response. Such a passenger-taxicab
equilibrium is said to induce supply s′.
Our goal in the continuous setting is to set surge prices so that the new supply s′ = d
is a passenger-taxicab equilibrium.
In this continuous setting we take demand d to be insensitive to the surge prices.
In the next section we describe the discrete setting where both the demand and
the supply are sensitive to the prices. One could define a continuous passenger-
taxicab setting where every location has an associated density function for passenger
valuations. Then, we could convert this continuous setting to an instance of the
discrete passenger-taxicab setting with 1/ǫ taxicabs/passengers. Under appropriate
conditions, this will give a good approximation to a continuous passenger-taxicab
setting where both demand and supply are sensitive to surge pricing.
2.2 The Discrete Passenger-Taxicab Setting
As above, we model the network as a finite metric space G = (V,E), and the cost
to a taxicab to switch between vertices u and v is the distance between them, ℓu,v.
Unlike the continuous case, there is an integral number of taxicabs and passengers
at every vertex.
Let B = {b1, . . . , bm} be a set of m passengers and T = {t1, . . . , tn} be a set of n
taxicabs. Every passenger bi ∈ B has a value value(bi) ≥ 0 for service. A supply s
is a vector s = 〈sv〉v∈V where sv ⊆ T for all v ∈ V , ∪v∈V sv = T , and sv ∩ su = ∅ for
all u, v ∈ V , u 6= v.
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A profile P is a partition of the passengers B, where for each u ∈ V the set Pu ⊆ B
is the set of passengers at u. A demand is a function of a vertex and a surge price
at the vertex. We define the function dv as follows:
dv(rv) = {bi ∈ Pv|value(bi) ≥ rv}.
Ergo, dv(rv) is the set of passengers at vertex v that are interested in service given
that the price is rv, i.e., those passengers whose value is at least rv. Note that
dv(0) = Pv.
For ease of notation, we denote a collection of entities xv for each vertex v ∈ V , by
x = 〈xv〉v∈V . For example, s = 〈sv〉v∈V , d = 〈dv〉, and r = 〈rv〉v∈V .
Define a flow f from supply s to supply s′ as follows. The flow f(x, y) : V ×V 7→ Z+
has the following properties:
• For all u, v ∈ V , f(u, v) ∈ Z+.
• For all u ∈ V , ∑v∈V f(u, v) = |su|.
• For all v ∈ V , ∑u∈V f(u, v) = |s′v|.
The flow from a vertex u is equal to the number of taxicabs at u under supply s,
i.e., |su|. The flow into a vertex v is equal to the number of taxicabs at v under
supply s′, i.e., |s′v|. The cost of a flow in the discrete setting is the same as the cost
of a flow in the continuous setting (Definition 2.2), i.e.,
∑
u,v∈V f(u, v)ℓu,v.
We now define the demand served at a vertex u,
Definition 2.6. For a vertex v, given a supply s′v, a surge price rv, and a demand
dv(rv), we define the demand served, dsv(s
′
v, dv, rv) ⊆ Pv, as follows:
• If |dv(rv)| ≤ |s′v| then dsv(s′v, dv, rv) = dv(rv).
• If |s′v| < |dv(rv)| then dsv(s′v, dv, rv) is the set of the |s′v| highest valued pas-
sengers from dv(rv), breaking ties arbitrarily.
Given demand functions d, surge prices r, and new supply s′, the total demand
served ds(s′, d, r) and its value dsv(s′, d, r) is given by
ds(s′, d, r) = ∪v∈V dsv(s′v, dv, rv);
dsv(s′, d, r) =
∑
bi∈ds(s′,d,r)
value(bi).
Definition 2.7. The social welfare is the difference between the sum of the values
of the passengers served and the cost of the min cost flow, which is the sum of the
distances traveled by the taxis. Namely, for current supply s, new supply s′, demand
functions d, and surge prices r, the social welfare is
SW (s, s′, r, d) = dsv(s′, d, r)− em(s, s′). (2)
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Remark: we did not define social welfare in the continuous passenger-taxicab setting
where the passengers are price insensitive. However, one can view the social welfare
in the price-insensitive demand setting as a special case of the responsive demand
setting when all passenger valuations are very high.
Like the definitions for utility and passenger-taxicab equilibria in the continuous
case, one can define them for the discrete case: The utility of a taxicab tj ∈ su
moving from u to v, given new supply s′, surge prices r and demand functions d, is
µtj(u 7→ v|s′, r, d) =
min(|dv(rv)|, |s′v|)
|s′v|
· rv − ℓu,v.
Definition 2.8. Given demand d , current supply s and new supply s′, surge prices
r are said to be in passenger-taxicab equilibrium if for every min cost flow f from s
to s′ and for any u, v such that f(u, v) > 0 we have that
• Taxicabs are choosing a best response: µtj (u 7→ v|s′, r, d) = maxw∈V (µtj (u 7→
w|s′, r, d)).
• All passengers b ∈ B with value(b) > rloc(b) are served. No passengers b ∈ B
with value(b) < rloc(b) are served.
2.3 Online Setting
In the online setting we inherit the continuous model setting, adding a function of
time. Time progresses in discrete time steps 1, 2, . . . , T . At time t the demand vector
dt = (dt1, d
t
2, . . . , d
t
k) associates each vertex v ∈ V with some demand dtv ≥ 0, and
we assume that the total demand
∑
i d
t
i = 1. One should not think of a time step
as being instantaneous, but rather as a period of time during which the demands
remain steady.
Every time step t also has an associated supply vector st = (st1, s
t
2, . . . , s
t
k), where
sti ≥ 0 and
∑
i s
t
i = 1 for all t. The supply at time t is a “reshuffle” of the supply at
time t− 1, by having infintestimally small suppliers moving about the network. In
our model, the time required for suppliers to adjust supply from st−1 to st is small
relative to the period of time during which demand dt is valid.
If the demand in vertex i at time t is dti, and the supply in vertex i at time t is
sti, then the minimum of the two is the actual demand served (in vertex i at time
t). Note that if the two are not identical then there are either unhappy customers
(without service) or unhappy suppliers (with no customer to service). Formally, we
define the benefit derived during each time period, the demand served, as in the
continuous model.
We define the social welfare as follows:
Definition 2.9. Given a demand sequence d = (d1, . . . , dT ) and a supply sequence
s = (s1, . . . , sT ) we define the social welfare
sw(s, d) = ds(s, d)− em(s) =
T∑
t=1
ds(st, dt)−
T∑
t=2
em(st−1, st).
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An online algorithm for social welfare follows the following structure. At time t =
1, 2, . . . , T :
1. A new demand vector dt appears.
2. The online algorithm determines what the supply vector st should be. (Indi-
rectly, by computing and posting surge prices so that the resulting passenger-
taxicab-equilibrium induces supply st).
The goal of the online algorithm is to maximize the social welfare as given in Def-
inition 2.9: Compute a supply sequence s, so as to maximize sw(s, d). The supply
vector st is a function of the demand vectors d1, . . . , dt but not of any demand vec-
tor dτ , for τ > t. Implicitly, we assume that the passenger-taxicab equilibrium is
attained quickly relative to the rate at which demand changes.
The competitive ratio of such an online algorithm, Alg, is the worst case ratio
between the numerator: the social welfare resulting from the demand sequence d
and the online supply Alg(d), and the denominator: the optimal social welfare for
the same demand sequence, i.e.,
min
d
sw(Alg(d), d)
maxs sw(s, d)
.
3 The Continuous Passenger-Taxicab Setting
In this section we deal with the continuous passenger-taxicab setting. Given current
supply s, demand d and new supply s′ = d, we show how to set surge prices r such
that they are in passenger-taxicab equilibria. Moreover, for these s, d, and r, the
only possible s′ which results in a passenger-taxicab equilibria is s′ = d. (Similar
techniques give surge prices that induce [almost] arbitrary supply vectors, s˜, see
below).
Proof overview: Given some min cost flow f ∗ from supply s to demand d, we con-
struct a unit demand market, with bidders and items. For every x, y such that
f ∗(x, y) > 0 we construct a bidder and an item. We also define bidder valuations
for all items. This unit demand market has Walrasian clearing prices that maximize
social welfare (Lemma 3.2). We show how we can convert the Walrasian prices on
items to surge pricing (Lemma 3.4).
We then show and that the resulting surge pricing has a passenger-taxicab equilib-
rium which induces supply equals demand (Lemma 3.5) and it is the case with all
all passenger-taxicab equilibria (Lemma 3.7). Lemma 3.6 shows that the incentive
requirements in Equation (1) also hold for any min cost flow f 6= f ∗, from s to d.
This proves Theorem 3.8.
As a running example, consider the road network in Figure 1. Also, assume that the
supply vector st−1 = 〈1
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
, 0, 0, 0〉 and demand vector dt = 〈0, 0, 1
8
, 3
8
, 3
8
, 1
8
〉. Two
minimum cost flows are given in Figures 2 and 3. Both these flows have cost 1.
Given a minimum cost flow f ∗, we define a unit demand market setting as follows:
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v1 v2 v3
v4 v5 v6
1 1
1 1
2
2
1
2
3 2
1
2 3
2
1
Figure 1: Example road
network, with costs along
edges.
v1 v2 v3
v4 v5 v6
1
8
1
81
12
7
24
1
24
1
3
Figure 2: A min earth-
mover cost flow from supply
vector st−1 = 〈13 , 13 , 13 , 0, 0, 0〉
to demand vector dt =
〈0, 0, 18 , 38 , 38 , 18〉.
v1 v2 v3
v4 v5 v6
1
8
1
81
24
1
24
1
3
1
3
Figure 3: Another min
earthmover cost flow
from from supply vec-
tor st−1 = 〈13 , 13 , 13 , 0, 0, 0〉
to demand vector
dt = 〈0, 0, 18 , 38 , 38 , 18 〉.
m14 m24 m25 m33 m35 m36
b14 3 3 2 2 2 1
b24 2 2 3 3 3 2
b25 2 2 3 3 3 2
b33 1 1 2 4 2 3
b35 1 1 2 4 2 3
b36 1 1 2 4 2 3
pij 0 0 1 3 1 2
Figure 4: Item val-
uations for bidders
Bf = {b14, b24, b25, b33, b35, b36},
items Mf =
{m14,m24,m25,m33,m35,m36},
where f is the min earth-
mover flow given in Figure
2. Note that in Figure 1
we have maxij(ℓij) = 3 and
thus C = 4. The last row
gives Walrasian market
clearing prices for items
mij. Note that pij = pij′ for
all bij, bij′ ∈ Bf .
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v1 v2 v3 v4 v5 v6
rti 1 1 1 4 3 2
Figure 5: Surge prices re-
sulting in a flow-equilibrium
with st = dt. These surge
price for vj is C− pij if there
exists some bidder bij ∈ Bf
and 1 otherwise. The Wal-
rasian prices pij appear in
Figure 4.
• Items Mf∗ , and unit demand bidders Bf∗ , both of which are indexed by pairs
of vertices, where
Mf
∗
= {mxy|x, y ∈ V, f ∗(x, y) > 0} Bf∗ = {bwz|w, z ∈ V, f ∗(w, z) > 0}.
• We set the value of item mxy ∈Mf∗ to bidder bwz ∈ Bf∗ to be,
ζbwz(mxy) = C − ℓw,y, where C = max
i,j
ℓi,j + 1.
• The utilities of bidders are unit demand and quasi-linear, i.e., the utility ηbwz
of bidder bwz ∈ Bf∗ for item set S and price p is
ηbwz(S) = max
mxy∈S
ζbwz(mxy)− p.
As an example, let f ∗ be the minimum cost flow of Figure 2. The market induced
by f ∗ is illustrated in Figure 4.
Given a flow f ∗, bidders Bf
∗
and items Mf
∗
we define the following weighted bipar-
tite graph G(Bf
∗
,Mf
∗
, E), where between bidder bwz ∈ Bf∗ and item mxy ∈ Mf∗
there is an edge of weight C − ℓw,y ≥ 1.
Definition 3.1. Given a flow f ∗, a matching between bidders Bf
∗
and items Mf
∗
is a function π : Bf
∗ 7→ Mf∗ ∪ {∅}, where bidder b ∈ Bf∗ is matched to item
π(b) ∈ Mf∗ or unmatched (if π(b) = ∅), such that no two bidders b1, b2 ∈ Bf∗ are
matched to the same item m ∈ Mf∗ .
As there is an edge between every bidder bwz and every item mxy with weight
C − ℓw,y ≥ 1, the maximum weight matching is a perfect matching between bidders
and items and the mapping π never assigns ∅ to a bidder.
Lemma 3.2. The matching g where g(bwz) = mwz, maximizes social welfare. In
addition, there exist Walrasian prices for which g is a competitive market equilib-
rium.
Proof. The proof is via contradiction. Assume there exists some matching g˜ : Bf
∗ 7→
Mf
∗
with strictly greater social welfare than the matching g. For a bidder b ∈ Bf∗ ,
define h˜(b) = z, iff g˜(b) = mwz for some w ∈ V , and h(b) = z, iff g(b) = mwz for some
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w ∈ V . Note that h(bwu) = u so for a given w and z we have |{u|h(bwu) = z}| = 1
if f(w, z) > 0 and zero otherwise.
Choose ǫ to be the minimum non-zero flow in f ∗, i.e., ǫ = min{f ∗(w, z)|f ∗(w, z) >
0}. We now define a flow f ′, which is a slight perturbation of flow f ∗. In flow f ′,
the flow from w to z is:
f ′(w, z) = f ∗(w, z) + ǫ
(∣∣∣{u|h˜(bwu) = z}∣∣∣− |{u|h(bwu) = z}|).
We first prove that f ′ is a valid flow, and later we show that it has a lower cost than
f ∗, in contradiction to the minimality of f ∗.
Lemma 3.3. Flow f ′ is a valid flow from supply vector st−1 to demand vector dt.
Proof. Consider the requirements that f ′ be a valid flow:
• For all x, y ∈ V , f ′(x, y) ≥ 0 : By definition of f ′ if f ∗(w, z) = 0 then f ′(w, z) ≥
0 and if f ∗(w, z) > 0 then f ′(w, z) ≥ f ∗(w, z)−min{f ∗(w, z)|f(w, z) > 0} ≥ 0.
• For all x ∈ V , ∑y f ′(x, y) = st−1x : By definition of f ∗ we have ∑y f ∗(x, y) =
st−1x . Thus,∑
y
f ′(x, y) =
∑
y
(
f ∗(x, y) +
(∣∣∣{u|h˜(bxu) = y}∣∣∣− |{u|h(bxu) = y}|) · ǫ)
= st−1x +
(∑
y
∣∣∣{u|h˜(bxu) = y}∣∣∣−∑
y
|{u|h(bxu) = y}|
)
· ǫ
= st−1x +
(∣∣{u|bxu ∈ Bf}∣∣− ∣∣{u|bxu ∈ Bf}∣∣) · ǫ
= st−1x .
• For all y ∈ V ,∑x f ′(x, y) = dty : By definition of f ∗ we have∑x f ∗(x, y) = dty.
Thus,∑
x
f ′(x, y) =
∑
x
(
f ∗(x, y) +
(∣∣∣{u|h˜(buy) = x}∣∣∣− |{u|h(buy) = x}|) · ǫ)
= dty +
(∑
x
∣∣∣{u|h˜(buy) = x}∣∣∣−∑
x
|{u|h(buy) = x}|
)
· ǫ
= dty +
(∣∣{u|buy ∈ Bf}∣∣− ∣∣{u|buy ∈ Bf}∣∣) · ǫ
= dty.
From the fact that g˜ has a higher social welfare we get,∑
w,z:bwz∈Bf
∗
ζbwz(g˜(bwz)) >
∑
w,z:bwz∈Bf
∗
ζbwz(g(bwz)) .
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Using the definition of the valuations we have,∑
w,z:bwz∈Bf
∗
C − ℓw,h˜(bwz ) >
∑
w,z:bwz∈Bf
∗
C − ℓw,h(bwz) .
This implies that ∑
w,z:bwz∈Bf
∗
ℓw,h(bwz) >
∑
w,z:bwz∈Bf
∗
ℓw,h˜(bwz) .
Using this last inequality, it follows that the cost of f ∗ (Definition 2.2) satisfies
em(f ∗) =
∑
x,y
f ∗(x, y) · ℓx,y
>
∑
x,y
f ∗(x, y) · ℓx,y +
 ∑
w,z:bwz∈Bf
ℓw,h˜(bwz) −
∑
w,z:bwz∈Bf
ℓw,h(bwz)
 · ǫ = em(f ′),
which contradicts the fact that flow f ∗ is a minimum cost flow.
The fact that there exist Walrasian prices for g that are in competitive market
equilibrium follows from [14]. This concludes the proof of Lemma 3.2.
Let the Walrasian price of mxy be pxy as guaranteed by the lemma above. We first
show that any two prices which correspond to the same vertex must have the same
price.
Lemma 3.4. For any two items mxy and mx′y we have pxy = px′y.
Proof. For contradiction assume that pxy > px′y. Let bwz be the bidder assigned
mxy. Thus, for item mxy bidder bwz has utility ηbwz(mxy) = C − ℓw,y − pxy <
C − ℓw,y − px′y = ηbwz(mx′y) which implies that mxy is not in the demand set for
bidder bwz. A contradiction to the fact that p are Walrasian prices.
For any y ∈ V such that there exist items of the form mxy for some x ∈ V , let py
denote the Walrasian price for such items (By Lemma 3.4 all those Walrasian prices
are identical). If no items of the form mxy exist, this implies that demand at vertex
y, dty = 0, and we can set py = 0. Define surge prices, r
t
y = C − py, for all y ∈ V .
Lemma 3.5. Given current supply st−1 and demand dt, surge prices rty = C − py,
new support s′ = d, and x, y, w ∈ V such that f ∗(x, y) > 0 then
µt(x→ y|s′, r, d) ≥ µt(x→ w|s′, r, d).
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Proof. Let x, y be such that f ∗(x, y) > 0.Then,
µt(x→ y|s′, r, d) = rty ·min
(
1,
dty
sty
)
− ℓx,y (3)
= rty − ℓx,y (4)
= C − py − ℓx,y (5)
= ηbxy(mxy) (6)
≥ ηbxy(mzw) ∀mzw ∈ Mf
∗ ⇔ ∀mzw : s′w > 0 (7)
= C − pw − ℓx,w (8)
= rtw − ℓx,w (9)
≥ rtw ·min
(
1,
dtw
stw
)
− ℓx,w (10)
= µt(x→ w|s′, r, d) (11)
Equations (3),(11) follow from the definition of the utility in the continuous passenger-
taxicab setting, definition 2.4.
Equations (4),(10) follows from considering the passenger-taxicab equilibrium where
st = dt resulting in
dty
sty
= 1 for all y.
Equations (5),(9) follow from the definition of the surge prices.
Equations (6),(8) follow from the definition of the utility in the market setting.
Equation (7) follows from the market equilibrium.
So, we have that
µt(x→ y|s′, r, d) ≥ µt(x→ w|s′, r, d) ∀w : s′w > 0.
It remains to consider µt(x→ w|s′, r, d) for w such that s′w = 0. In this case the
surge price at w is zero, so the utility µt(x→ w|s′, r, d) ≤ 0.
The following lemma shows that the incentive requirements of Equation (1) hold,
not only for the flow f ∗, but also for any min cost flow from s to d.
Lemma 3.6. Fix current supply st−1 and demand dt, surge prices rty = C − py, and
new support s′ = d. Let f ′ be an arbitrary min cost flow from s to s′ = d, then, for
any x, y, w ∈ V such that f ′(x, y) > 0 we have that
µt(x→ y|s′, r, d) ≥ µt(x→ w|s′, r, d).
Proof. Define
Γ(f) =
∑
u∈V
∑
v∈V
f(u, v) · (rv − ℓu,v) =
∑
v∈V
s′v · rv − em(s, s′).
As f ′ and f ∗ are both min cost flows from s to s′ we have that Γ(f ∗) = Γ(f ′).
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For contradiction assume there exist some u, v such that f ′(u, v) > 0 and µ(u 7→
v|s′, r, d) < maxw∈V µ(u 7→ w|s′, r, d).
Γ(f ∗) =
∑
u∈V
∑
v∈V
f ∗(u, v) · (rv − ℓu,v) (12)
=
∑
u∈V
∑
v∈V
f ∗(u, v) ·max
v∈V
(rv − ℓu,v) (13)
=
∑
u∈V
su ·max
v∈V
(rv − ℓu,v) (14)
=
∑
u∈V
∑
v∈V
f ′(u, v) ·max
v∈V
(rv − ℓu,v) (15)
>
∑
u∈V
∑
v∈V
f ′(u, v) · (rv − ℓu,v) = Γ(f ′) . (16)
Eq. (12) follows from the definition of Γ. Eq. (13) follows from Lemma 3.5. Eq.
(14) and (15) follows from the definition of a flow, since for any flow f from s we have
that su =
∑
v∈V f(u, v). Eq. (16) holds since we assumed, for contradiction, that
there exist some u, v such that f ′(u, v) > 0 and µ(u 7→ v|s′, r, d) < maxw∈V µ(u 7→
w|s′, r, d). Hence, we reached a contradiction to the assumption that f ′ is a min
cost flow.
If follows from the Lemma above that computing surge prices r via flow f ∗ ensures
that taxicab routing using any other min cost flow f ′ is also a best response under
surge prices r.
Next we show that all relevant passenger-taxicab equilibria all have new supply
st = dt.
Lemma 3.7. Given current supply s, demand d, and surge prices rty = C − py, all
passenger-taxicab equilibria induce st = d.
Proof. Let f be a min cost flow from s to d. For contradiction, assume that that there
exists some s¯ 6= d such that s, s′ = s¯, d, r are in a passenger-taxicab equilibrium.
Let f ′ be some min cost flow from s to s¯.
Consider H =
{
y|∑x f ′(x, y) > dty} (i.e., the set of all vertices for which the flow
f ′ results in strictly more supply than demand). Since s′ 6= d and they both sum
to 1, we have that H 6= ∅. Let H ′ = {x|∃y ∈ H s.t. f ′(x, y) > 0} (i.e., the set of all
vertices from which supply flows to H). As H 6= ∅ it follows that H ′ 6= ∅.
We claim that there exists some w ∈ H ′, y 6∈ H , such that f(w, y) > 0. For
contradiction assume that all the flow in f from vertices in H ′ is to vertices in H .
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By definition of flows:
∑
y∈V f(x, y) = s
t−1
x =
∑
y∈V f
′(x, y). We now have,∑
x∈H′
∑
y∈V
f(x, y) =
∑
x∈H′
∑
y∈H
f(x, y)
=
∑
x∈H′
∑
y∈H
f ′(x, y)
=
∑
y∈H
∑
x∈H′
f ′(x, y)
>
∑
y∈H
dty
=
∑
x∈H′
∑
y∈H
f(x, y),
which is a contradiction.
This implies that there exist w ∈ H ′, x 6∈ H such that f(w, x) > 0. Since w ∈ H ′
there also exists some y ∈ H such that f ′(w, y) > 0.
We have shown that s, s′ = d, d, r is in passenger-taxicab equilibrium, this implies
that
µt(w 7→ x|s′, r, d) = rtx − ℓw,x ≥ rty − ℓw,y = µt(w 7→ y|s′, r, d).
Since y ∈ H we have we have that ∑u f ′(u, y) > dty resulting in the utility
µt(w 7→ y|s′, r, d) = (rty − ℓw,y)·min(1, dtysty
)
< rty−ℓw,y ≤ rtx−ℓw,x = µt(w 7→ x|s′, r, d),
where x 6∈ H implies the last equality. This is in contradiction to the s, s′ = s¯, d, r
being a passenger-taxicab equilibrium.
Theorem 3.8 follows from Lemma 3.5, Lemma 3.6, and Lemma 3.7.
Theorem 3.8. Given distances ℓi,j and an arbitrary supply vector, s
t−1 = 〈st−11 , . . . , st−1k 〉.
Let the demand vector be dt = 〈dt1, . . . , dtk〉. Then, there exists a surge price vector
rt = 〈rt1, . . . , rtk〉 that results in a passenger-texicab equilibrium which induces a sup-
ply st = dt. Moreover, any passenger-taxicab equilibrium of rt induces supply st = dt,
and the surge prices rt can be computed in polynomial time.
We can extend the result from equating supply and demand to modifying the supply
vector st−1 to any supply st, with the restriction that if sti > 0 then d
t
i > 0. The
new surge prices are computed as follows. First we compute, as before, the surge
prices rt from st−1 to dt. Then, we set r¯ti = max{1, s
t
i
dti
}rti and the resulting surge
prices are r¯t. In a similar way we can establish,
Theorem 3.9. Let dt = 〈dt1, . . . , dtk〉 and let α = 〈α1, . . . , αk〉 be the target supply
vector, subject to the restriction that if αi > 0 then d
t
i > 0. Then there exist surge
prices r¯t for which some passenger-taxicab equilibrium induces supply α.
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4 The Discrete Passenger-Taxicab Setting
In this section we consider a more realistic scenario where both demand and supply
are sensitive to the surge pricing. All else being equal, higher surge prices mean less
demand and more supply.
We define social welfare to be the sum of valuations of passengers served minus the
sum of the distances traversed by the taxicabs to serve these passengers (Definition
2.7). Given current supply s and a passenger profile P , we give an algorithm for com-
puting surge prices r that creates a passenger-taxicab equilibrium that maximizes
social welfare.
The location of a passenger bi and taxi tj is denoted by loc(bi) and loc(tj) respectively
(i.e., bi ∈ Ploc(bi) tj ∈ s(loc(tj))). For brevity, we use the notation ℓi,j = ℓloc(bi),loc(tj).
4.1 Maximizing Social Welfare
As in the continuous case, we reduce the problem of computing surge prices to
computing market clearing prices in a unit demand market. Given a set of passengers
B and taxicabs T , we construct a unit demand market M(B, T ), where B is the set
of buyers and T is the set of items. For the unit demand market, M(B, T ), we set
the value of buyer bi ∈ B for item tj ∈ T to be ζbi(tj) = value(bi)− ℓi,j.
Let the allocation where item tj is given to buyer(tj) = bi be a social welfare max-
imizing allocation in the unit demand market M(B, T ). Also, let buyer(tj) = ∅ if
item tj is unallocated.
This social welfare maximizing allocation in M(B, T ) translates into a flow f ∗ for
the discrete passenger-taxicab problem where tj moves from loc(tj) to loc(bi) if
buyer(tj) = bi. Ergo,
f ∗(u, v) =
{ |{(i, j)|bi ∈ Pv, tj ∈ su, buyer(tj) = bi}| if u 6= v,
|{(i, j)|bi ∈ Pv, tj ∈ su, buyer(tj) = bi}|+ |{j|tj ∈ su, buyer(tj) = ∅}|, if u = v.
Let s′ be such that s′v =
∑
u f
∗(u, v) for all v ∈ V . We say that the new supply s′
is induced by f ∗. We now show that
Lemma 4.1. The flow f ∗ is a min cost flow from s to s′.
Proof. Assume that f ′ is a flow from s to s′ of strictly lower cost. As f ′ is an integral
flow it can be decomposed into a union of unit flows. This can be interpreted as
an alternative allocation in the M(B, T ) unit demand market, with strictly higher
social welfare. This is in contradiction to our construction.
Choose the minimal Walrasian prices to clear the unit demand market M(B, T ).
Such prices are also VCG prices [17]. Let the Walrasian price for item tj be ptj .
We now define surge prices rv, v ∈ V , for the discrete passenger-taxicab problem.
Specifically, for all v ∈ V , set
rv = min
tj∈T
(ℓloc(tj ),v + ptj ). (17)
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Lemma 4.2. Assigning tj to serve passenger buyer(tj) is a social welfare maximiz-
ing allocation.
Proof. First, we show that for any allocation of taxicabs to passengers in the taxicab-
passenger setting there exists an allocation of items to buyers in the unit demand
marketM(B, T ) such that the social welfare is the same. Then, we show that for the
allocation of items to buyers that maximizes the social welfare in the unit demand
market there exists an allocation of taxicabs to passengers with the same social
welfare.
Fix an allocation of passengers to taxicabs, i.e., Φ : B → T ∪ {∅} is a matching.
Given the matching Φ we define an allocation Π : B → T ∪ {∅} in the unit demand
market where Φ(b) = Π(b) for all b ∈ B.
The social welfare of Φ in the taxicab-passenger setting is
∑
b∈B(value(b)−ℓloc(b),loc(Φ(b)))IΦ(b)6=∅.
Similarly, the social welfare of Π in the unit demand market setting is
∑
b∈B ζb(Π(b)) =∑
b∈B(value(b) − ℓloc(b),loc(Π(b)))IΠ(b)6=∅. Since Φ(b) = Π(b) it follows that any allo-
cation in the taxicab-passenger setting has a corresponding allocation in the unit
demand market with the same social welfare.
We now show that an allocation in the unit demand market that maximizes social
welfare has a corresponding allocation in the passenger-taxicab setting that also
maximizes social welfare. Denote the maximal allocation in the unit demand market
by Πmax : B → T ∪{∅}. Define the corresponding matching of passengers to taxicabs
by Φmax : B → T ∪ {∅}, where Φmax(b) = Πmax(b) for all b ∈ B (Φmax is a matching
since Πmax is a valid allocation in a unit demand market).
Moreover, we need to show that higher valued passengers have priority over lower
valued passengers at the same location. I.e., we need to show that for any two
passengers, b1, b2 ∈ B, such that loc(b1) = loc(b2) and Φmax(b1) 6= ∅, Φmax(b2) = ∅
we have that value(b1) ≥ value(b2).
Contrariwise, assume for some b1, b2 ∈ B we have that loc(b1) = loc(b2), Φmax(b1) 6=
∅, Φmax(b2) = ∅, but value(b1) < value(b2). Define in the unit demand market then
Π′ : B → T ∪ {∅} such that Π′(b1) = ∅, Π′(b2) = Φmax(b1) and Π′(b) = Πmax(b) for
all b /∈ {b1, b2}.
We now show that the social welfare under Π is strictly greater than the social
welfare under Π′:∑
b∈B
(ζb(Π
′(b))) =
∑
b∈B,b6=b1,b2
(ζb(Π
′(b))) + ζb2(Φmax(b1))
=
∑
b∈B,b6=b1,b2
(ζb(Πmax(b))) + value(b2)− dist(loc(b2), loc(Φmax(b1)))
>
∑
b∈B,b6=b1,b2
(ζb(Πmax(b))) + value(b1)− dist(loc(b1), loc(Φmax(b1)))
=
∑
b∈B
(ζb(Πmax(b))).
Thus, Π′ has strictly higher social welfare than Πmax in unit demand setting in
contradiction to Πmax maximizing social welfare. Thus, Φmax is a valid allocation in
the taxicab-passenger setting which maximizes the social welfare.
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Lemma 4.3. For any passenger bi such that bi = buyer(tj) we have that
ℓi,j + ptj = min
tz∈T
(ℓi,z + ptz) = rloc(bi).
Proof. Since bi = buyer(tj), and p are Walrasian prices, we have that buyer bi
maximizes its utility ηbi . Ergo,
ηbi(tj) = max
tx∈T
(ηbi(tx))
= max
tx∈T
(value(bi)− ℓi,x − ptx)
= value(bi)−min
tx∈T
(ℓi,x + ptx)
= value(bi)− rloc(bi).
As
ηbi(tj) = value(bi)− ℓi,j − ptj = value(bi)− rloc(bi)
it follows that
ℓi,j + ptj = min
tx∈T
(ℓi,x + ptx).
Lemma 4.4. Any passenger bi that is not served is not interested in being served
(or is indifferent), i.e., then value(bi) ≤ rloc(bi). Any passenger bi that is served has
value(bi) ≥ rloc(bi).
Proof. Let bi be some buyer allocated no item in the social welfare maximizing
allocation for M(B, T ), then it must be that maxtx∈T ηbi(tx) ≤ 0. It follows that
max
tx∈T
(value(bi)− ℓi,x − ptx) ≤ 0,
and thus
value(bi) ≤ min
tx∈T
(ℓi,x + ptx) = rloc(bi).
Consider some buyer bi that was allocated an item, tj , in the social welfare maxi-
mizing allocation for M(B, T ). It follows that maxtx∈T ηbi(tx) ≥ 0. Thus,
max
tx∈T
(value(bi)− ℓi,x − ptx) ≥ 0,
and
value(bi) ≥ min
tx∈T
(ℓi,x + ptx) = rloc(bi).
Lemma 4.5. For supply s, demand d, surge prices r, and new supply s′ as defined
above. A taxicab tj that serves passenger buyer(tj) is doing a best response.
Proof. Consider the following cases:
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1. Item tj is not allocated, i.e., buyer(tj) = ∅. It follows that the Walrasian
pricing for item tj is zero: ptj = 0. Now, for any w ∈ V we have that
rw = min
tx∈T
(ℓw,loc(tx) + ptx) ≤ ℓw,loc(tj ) + ptj = ℓw,loc(tj),
hence, rw − ℓw,loc(tj) ≤ 0. Ergo, not serving any passenger is a best response
for tj.
2. Item tj is allocated to some buyer bi. From Lemma 4.3 we know that ℓi,j+ptj =
mintx∈T (ℓi,x+ ptx) = rloc(bi) and thus tj gains a utility of ptj from serving bi. If
taxicab tj could serve a passenger at location w ∈ V , it will gain a utility of
rw − ℓw,loc(tj ) = min
tx∈T
(ℓw,loc(tx) + ptx)− ℓw,loc(tj ) ≤ ℓw,loc(tj ) + ptj − ℓw,loc(tj ) = ptj .
Implying that serving passenger bi is a best response for taxicab tj.
Lemma 4.6. It is a dominant strategy for the passengers to reveal their true valu-
ations given that surge prices are computed via the algorithm above.
Proof. The utilities of the bidders for the minimal Walrasian prices in a unit demand
market coincide with VCG payments [17]. This implies that buyers truthfully reveal
their valuations for the items. In our setting the utility for a passenger bi is exactly
equal to the utility for the corresponding bidder bi. Ergo, misreporting passenger
valuation implies misreporting bidder valuations. As misreporting item valuations
in the unit demand market setting cannot benefit buyers (and thus passengers) we
conclude it is a dominant strategy for passengers to report true valuations.
To summarize, our main result in this section, Theorem 4.7, follows from Lemma
4.2, Lemma 4.4, Lemma 4.5, and Lemma 4.6.
Theorem 4.7. For any Profile P and supply s there exist surge prices r, demand
d(r) and new supply s′ such that
• Supply s, new supply s′, demand d(r), and surge prices r are in passenger-
taxicab equilibrium.
• s′ is social welfare maximizing with respect to supply s, profile P , and demand
d.
• The surge prices r can be computed in polynomial time.
• It is a dominant strategy for passengers to report their true valuations to the
surge-price computation.
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5 Optimal Competitive Online Algorithms for So-
cial Welfare
In this section we give online algorithms that determine supply (using surge prices)
so as to maximize social welfare as given in Definition 2.9. I.e., striking a balance
between maximizing the quality of service vs. the costs associated with shifting
resources about.
The results2 in this section can be obtained by online algorithms that set the supply
to be one of the following:
1. Set supply at time t equal demand at time t, i.e., set st = dt.
2. Set supply at time t equal to the supply at time t− 1, i.e., set st = st−1.
It follows from Theorem 3.8 that using appropriate surge prices we can determine
that st = dt as the unique passenger-taxicab equilibrium. It is easy to leave the
supply unchanged by choosing rti = 1 for all i. It follows that the resulting passenger-
taxicab equilibrium has no positive flow from i to j 6= i, as ℓij ≥ 1 for all j 6= i —
ergo st = st−1.
Given a demand sequence d we define ρ as the inverse of the maximum demand at
any vertex and time, i.e., 1/ρ = maxi,t d
t
i. Note that ρ ≤ k since at any time t there
is a vertex i such that dti ≥ 1/k. Moreover, ρ ≥ 1 since dti ≤ 1, for any time t and
vertex i.
Consider the following online algorithms:
rand(p) — With probability p set surge prices such that supply equals demand at
all vertices. I.e., at time t = 1 set s1 = d1; for all t > 1 with probability p set
st = dt and with probability 1− p set st = st−1.
stay — Split the supply equally over all vertices. I.e., at time t = 1 set s1 =
〈 1
k
, 1
k
, . . . , 1
k
〉 and for all t > 1 set st = st−1.
match — Always set supply equal demand, i.e., set st = dt for all t ≥ 1 . Note that
match and rand(1) are identical.
composite(p) — Toss a fair coin, if heads run stay otherwise run rand(p). The ex-
pected social welfare of composite(p) satisfies E[composite(p)] = E[stay]/2+
E[rand(p)]/2.
In different scenarios different algorithms are useful. We later discuss how to switch
between different online algorithms in changing circumstances, varying over time.
Like many other online problems, we first show that the optimal solution can be
assumed to be “lazy”, never move supply about unnecessarily (Section 5.1). Section
2These are randomized online algorithms. Alternately, one could give deterministic online
algorithms with the same guarantees by using the passenger-taxicab equilibria and surge prices
derived from Theorem 3.9, with the disadvantages that the equilibria is no longer unique and that
this requires some additional technical assumptions.
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5.2 gives our main technical result. In this setting the cost of moving from one
vertex to another always equals 1, i.e., ℓij = 1 for i 6= j. In this scenario we show
that composite(
√
1/k) achieves [an optimal] Θ(1/
√
k) fraction of the optimal social
welfare. More generally, the competitive ratio improves as a function of the maximal
demand in a single vertex (a 1/ρ fraction of the total demand) — in this setting
composite(
√
ρ/k) achieves [an optimal] Θ(
√
ρ/k) fraction of the optimal social
welfare. The positive result appears in Theorem 5.2, whereas optimality follows
from Lemma 5.11.
In Section 5.4 we consider several other scenarios:
• Clearly, even for completely arbitrary costs ℓij (to move supply from i to j),
algorithm stay is trivially ρ/k competitive. In Section 5.4.1 we prove that
this cannot be improved. This shows that it is critical that ℓij = 1 to obtain
a non-trivial bound, without other assumptions on the input sequence.
• In Section 5.4.2 we consider inputs where the total drift (average total variation
distance between successive demand vectors) is small. In such settings the
match algorithm approaches the optimal social welfare, for sufficiently small
drift. Moreover, essentially the same bounds are tight.
5.1 The Optimal Supply Sequence is Lazy
We define lazy sequences and show that without loss of generality the optimal supply
sequence is a lazy sequence. We have two types of “non-lazy” actions: increasing
supply in a location with supply greater than demand (over supply), or reducing
supply in a location while creating over demand. Both actions can be avoided,
without loss in social welfare. We start by defining a lazy sequence.
Definition 5.1. A supply sequence is lazy if for any time t and any u, v ∈ V, u 6= v
such that f t(u, v) > 0 then both (1) stv ≤ dtv and (2) st−1u > dtu.
We show that for any supply sequence there exists a lazy supply sequence whose
social welfare is at least the social welfare of the original sequence.
Lemma 5.2. Fix a demand sequence d. Given an arbitrary supply sequence s, there
exists a lazy supply sequence s¯ such that sw(s¯) ≥ sw(s).
Proof. For contradiction, assume there is a sequence s for which for any lazy se-
quence s¯ we have sw(s) > sw(s¯). Note that essentially we are saying that there is
an optimal sequence s for which no lazy sequence has the same social welfare. This
implies that for any optimal sequence s there is a time t such that f t(u, v) > 0 and
either (1) stv > d
t
v or (2) s
t−1
u < d
t
u. Out of all the optimal sequences, consider the
optimal sequence s with the largest such time t and largest pair (u, v) (given some
full order on the pairs V × V ).
We create a new flow f¯ depending on the type of violation. Assume that we have
f t(u, v) > 0 and stv > d
t
v. At time t set f¯
t(u, v) = f t(u, v) − ǫ and f¯ t(u, u) =
f t(u, u)+ǫ, where ǫ = min{stv−dtv, f t(u, v)}. The rest of the flow remains unchanged,
i.e., f¯ t(u′, v′) = f t(u′, v′) for (u′, v′) 6= (u, v) or (u′, v′) 6= (u, u).
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At time t + 1 we adjust the flow to correspond to the original supply. Namely,
for all w ∈ V such that f t+1(v, w) > 0, we set f¯ t+1(v, w) = f t+1(v, w) stv−ǫ
stv
and
f¯ t+1(u, w) = f t+1(u, w) + f t+1(v, w) ǫ
stv
, and all the remaining flows remain un-
changed. It is straightforward to verify that f¯ is a valid flow, and we set st+1v =
s¯t+1v =
∑
u f¯
t+1(u, v).
Note that the only influence on the social welfare are in times t and t+1. Comparing
the movement cost of s¯ to s, at time t it decreased by ǫ and in time t+ 1 increased
by at most ǫ. The demand served in s¯ and s at time t and t+1 in unchanged (since
the ǫ flow that was modified did not serve any demand in time t and at time t + 1
the supplies are identical). This implies that the social welfare of s¯ is at least that
of s. Therefore we have a contradiction to our selection of t and (u, v).
The case that we have f t(u, v) > 0 and st−1u < d
t
u is similar and omitted.
We derive the following immediate corollary.
Corollary 5.3. Without loss of generality the optimal supply sequence is lazy.
5.2 Online Algorithms for Social Welfare Maximization when
ℓij = 1
We now analyse the lazy optimal supply sequence. We first introduce some notation.
Given an optimal lazy supply sequence s, define hti = min{st−1i , dti}. Let n ≥ 0 be
an integer parameter, and define3
zti = max{0, hti − gti}, where gti = max
τ∈[max(1,t−n),t−1]
dτi .
Note that the definitions depend on s, but we use a fixed optimal lazy sequence s.
Note too that n is yet undetermined.
Lemma 5.4. Fix a demand sequence d and an optimal lazy supply sequence s for
d. The resulting social welfare
opt = sw(s, d) =
∑
t,i
hti ≤
∑
t,i
zti +
∑
t,i
gti.
Proof. Note that when ℓij = 1 for all i, j we get that em(s) =
∑
t
1
2
‖st − st−1‖1.
This means that for an optimal lazy sequence we have
opt = sw(s, d) = ds(s, d)− em(s) =
∑
t
∑
i
min(sti, d
t
i)−
∑
t
∑
i:sti≥s
t−1
i
(
sti − st−1i
)
.
First consider sti > s
t−1
i . Since the sequence is lazy and s
t
i > s
t−1
i this implies that
sti ≤ dti. Hence, min(sti, dti) = sti and min(st−1i , dti) = st−1i . It follows that the identity
min(sti, d
t
i)− (sti − st−1i ) = min(st−1i , dti) holds.
3For notational convenience we define dt
i
= 0 and st
i
= s1
i
for all t ≤ 0.
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Next consider sti < s
t−1
i . Since the sequence is lazy and s
t
i < s
t−1
i implies that
sti ≥ dti and that min(sti, dti) = dti = min(st−1i , dti). It follows yet again that the
identity min(sti, d
t
i) = min(s
t−1
i , d
t
i) holds.
Combining both identities we have
opt = sw(s, d) =
∑
t
∑
i
min(st−1i , d
t
i) =
∑
t
∑
i
hti,
by the definition of hti. Since, h
t
i ≤ zti + gti the lemma follows.
Our next goal is to bound the sum of zti and relate it to the social welfare of the
algorithm stay. We first prove the following properties of the optimal lazy supply
sequence.
Lemma 5.5. Fix an optimal lazy sequence s and a parameter n ≥ 1. If for some
i, t we have st−1i ≥ maxτ∈[t−n,t) dτi then we have minτ∈[t−n,t) sτi ≥ st−1i .
Proof. For contradiction assume there exists some maximal τ ∈ [t− n, t) such that
sτi < s
t−1
i . Then, τ 6= t− 1 and thus τ + 1 ∈ [t− n + 1, t) which by the assumption
of the lemma implies that st−1i ≥ dτ+1i . Also, because this is the maximal such τ we
have that sτ+1i ≥ st−1i . Thus, we have sτi < sτ+1i and dτ+1i < sτ+1i . This contradicts
the assumption that s is an optimal lazy sequence, since there is a flow to i at time
τ + 1 which strictly exceeds the demand.
We derive the following immediate corollary:
Corollary 5.6. Fix an optimal lazy sequence s and a parameter n ≥ 1. If for some
i, t we have st−1i ≥ maxτ∈[t−n,t) dτi then for any τ ∈ [t− n+ 1, t) we have sτ−1i ≥ sτi .
Proof. From Lemma 5.5, for any τ ∈ [t−n, t) we have that sτi ≥ st−1i ≥ maxτ ′∈[t−n,t) dτ ′i .
Therefore, sτi ≥ maxτ ′∈[τ−n′,τ) dτ ′i , where n′ = τ − (t − n) > 0. Now applying
Lemma 5.5 again we obtain the corollary.
Lemma 5.7. Fix an optimal lazy sequence s and a parameter n ≥ 1. Then,∑
i
∑
τ∈[t−n,t) z
τ
i ≤ 1.
Proof. Clearly we care only about zτi > 0. Fix a location i and let τ1, . . . , τm be all
the times τ ∈ [t− n, t) for which zτi > 0. Clearly,
∑
τ∈[t−n,t) z
τ
i =
∑m
j=1 z
τj
i .
First, if st−1i ≤ maxτ∈[t−n,t) dτi = gti , since hti ≤ st−1i then zti = 0. Therefore, at any
time τj we have s
τj−1
i > maxτˆ∈[t−n,t) d
τˆ
i , which implies that we can apply Corollary 5.6
at the times τj.
We claim that s
τj−1
i > d
τj
i for 1 ≤ j ≤ m − 1. For contradiction assume that
s
τj−1
i ≤ dτji . We have
hτmi ≤ sτm−1i ≤ sτj−1i ≤ dτji ≤ gτmi ,
where the first inequality is from the definition of h, the second follows from Corol-
lary 5.6, the third from our assumption, and the fourth from the definition of g. This
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implies that zτmi = max{0, hτmi −gτmi } = 0. In contradiction to our construction that
zτmi > 0. Therefore, s
τj−1
i > d
τj
i , which implies that h
τj
i = d
τj
i .
4
Since z
τj
i > 0, we have that z
τj
i = h
τj
i −gτji . We showed that hτji = dτji and gτji ≥ dτj−1i ,
hence, z
τj
i ≤ dτji − dτj−1i , for 2 ≤ j ≤ m− 1.
Summing over all τj we have
∑
τˆ∈[t−n,t)
zτˆi =
m∑
j=1
z
τj
i
= zτmi + z
τ1
i +
m−1∑
j=2
z
τj
i
≤ zτmi + zτ1i +
m−1∑
j=2
d
τj
i − dτj−1i
≤ zτmi + zτ1i + dτm−1i − dτ1i
≤ hτmi − (gτmi − dτm−1i ) + (hτ1i − gτ1i − dτ1i )
≤ hτmi
For the last inequality note that gτmi ≥ dτm−1i and that hτ1i ≤ dτ1i .
Summing over all locations i we have∑
i
∑
τˆ∈[t−n,t)
zτˆi ≤
∑
i
h
τmi
i ≤
∑
i
s
τmi
i ≤
∑
i
st−ni = 1
where the last inequality uses again Corollary 5.6.
We now analyze stay for arbitrary relocation costs ℓij.
Lemma 5.8. At all times t, the demand served by stay is at least ρ/k of the total
demand.
Proof. Recall that ds(st, dt) =
∑
imin(s
t
i, d
t
i) =
∑
imin
(
1
k
, dti
)
. Denote S =
{
i|sti ≥ 1k
}
.
If we have |S| ≥ ρ then ds(st, dt) ≥ 1
k
· |S| ≥ ρ
k
. Otherwise, since 1
ρ
≥ 1
k
the total
demand not in S is at least 1− |S|
ρ
and it is completely served by stay. Therefore,
ds
(
st, dt
) ≥ |S|·1
k
+1−|S|
ρ
=
kρ+ |S|ρ− |S|k
kρ
=
kρ− |S|(k − ρ)
kρ
≥ kρ+ ρ
2 − kρ
kρ
=
ρ
k
.
Now we analyze rand(p) and relate it to gti .
Lemma 5.9. Let ŝti be the random variable representing the supply of rand(p) time
t in vertex i. Then, E[ŝti] ≥ gtip(1 − p)n. In addition, the expected social welfare of
rand(p) is at least p(1− p)n∑i,t gti .
4This applies only to j ≤ m − 1 since gτm
i
does not include dτm
i
but does include all previous
d
τj
i
.
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Proof. Let τ = argmaxτˆ∈[t−n,t) d
τˆ
i , i.e., d
τ
i = g
t
i . We lower bound the expectation of
ŝti by the probability that rand(p) sets s
τ = dτ and keeps the supply until time t,
i.e., st = sτ . The probability that we have sτ = dτ is at least p. The probability
that st = sτ is at least (1 − p)n. Therefore, E[ŝti] ≥ gtip(1 − p)n, which implies that
the expected social welfare of rand(p) is at least p(1− p)n∑i,t gti .
Theorem 5.10. The algorithm composite(
√
ρ/k) = 1
2
stay + 1
2
rand(
√
ρ/k) is
( 1
2e
√
ρ
k
)-competitive.
Proof. By Lemma 5.4 we have that OPT =
∑
t,i h
t
i ≤
∑
t,i z
t
i + g
t
i. We bound
separately
∑
t,i z
t
i and
∑
t,i g
t
i .
By Lemma 5.7 we can partition the time to T
n
blocks of size n each, and in each
the sum is at most 1, therefore
∑
t,i z
t
i ≤ Tn . On the other hand, stay guarantees a
social welfare of at least ρ · T
k
.
We have that,
OPT ≤ T
n
+
∑
i,t
gti .
Using Lemma 5.8 and Lemma 5.9, we have
1
2
stay +
1
2
rand(p) ≥ ρ
2k
T +
1
2
p(1− p)n
∑
i,t
gti
For p =
√
ρ
k
and n = 1
p
we bound the competitive ratio as follows:
ρ T
2k
+ 1
2
p(1− p)n∑i,t gti
T
n
+
∑
i,t g
t
i
=
1
2
√
ρ
k
T
√
ρ
k
+ 1
2e
√
ρ
k
∑
i,t g
t
i
T
√
ρ
k
+
∑
i,t g
t
i
≥ 1
2e
√
ρ
k
.
5.3 Social Welfare Maximization when ℓij = 1: Impossibility
Results
We show that no online algorithm can hope to achieve a competitive ratio bet-
ter (greater) than O
(√
ρ
k
)
. Recall, that Section 5.2 describes an online algorithm,
composite(
√
ρ/k), that achieves this bound on the competitive ratio. Ergo, composite(
√
ρ/k)
achieves the optimal competitive ratio, up to a constant factor.
Theorem 5.11. Fix the metric ℓij = 1. No online algorithm can achieve a compet-
itive ratio better (greater) than O
(√
ρ
k
)
.
Proof. We first describe the proof for ρ = 1 and then extend it to arbitrary ρ.
Consider the following stochastic demand sequence. At time t we select at random
a vertex ct ∈ V , and assign all the demand to it, i.e., dtct = 1 and dti = 0 for i 6= ct.
Clearly any online algorithm has an expected social welfare of T/k.
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Essentially, for the optimal offline we use the birthday paradox to show that its
social welfare is Θ(T/
√
k). Consider the following offline strategy. Partition the
time to intervals of size of 2
√
k. We show that in any such interval the offline can
increase social welfare by at least 1 with constant probability.
Fix such a time interval. We claim that with constant probability some vertex
appears twice in the interval. If in the first
√
k times there is a vertex i that appears
twice, we are done. Otherwise, we have
√
k distinct vertices. The probability that
we resample one of those vertices in the next
√
k time steps is at least 1/e. Now, if
vertex i appears twice in the interval then the offline algorithm can move at the start
of the interval to vertex i and increase social welfare by at least 1. This implies that
the expected social welfare of this offline strategy is Θ(T/
√
k), which lower bounds
the expected social welfare of the optimal offline strategy.
Since the online algorithm has expected social welfare of T/k and the optimal offline
algorithm has expected social welfare of Θ(T/
√
k), the competitive ratio, for ρ = 1,
is bounded by O(
√
1/k).
We now sketch how the proof extends to a general ρ ≥ 1. In this case we partition
the k vertices into N = ⌊k/⌈ρ⌉⌋ disjoint subsets, each of size M = ⌈ρ⌉. (Note, that
N ·M ≤ k.) The N subsets replace the vertices V and each time we select a subset,
we give a uniform demand over the subset. (note that the demand per vertex is
1/M ≤ 1/ρ.)
As before, any online algorithm has expected social welfare of Θ(T/N) = Θ(Tρ/k).
Similar to before, there is an offline strategy that guarantees an expected social
welfare of Θ(T
√
ρ/k). This implies that the competitive ratio is at most Θ(
√
ρ/k).
5.4 Extensions
In (Section 5.4.1 we show that the assumption that ℓij = 1 was critical to achieve
the non-trivial competitive ratio of Section 5.2 unless ρ (the fraction of demand at
any single vertex) was sufficiently small. We also consider restricting the demand
sequences by bounding the average variability in demand. In Section 5.4.2 we show
that the online algorithm that greedily matches supply and demand works well, the
average drift is sufficiently small.
5.4.1 Arbitrary Metric Spaces
We can apply the online algorithm stay and guarantee a competitive ratio of ρ/k
as shown in Lemma 5.8. The following theorem establishes an impossibility result
when the costs are different than 1 (even if they are still identical).
Theorem 5.12. Fix some 1 > ǫ > 0, and consider costs ℓij = 1 + ǫ for i 6= j.
No online algorithm has a competitive ratio better (greater) than (1+ǫ)
2
ǫ
· 1
k
for this
metric.
Proof. The idea is the following: we generate a demand sequence that at every time
step demand is concentrated in a single vertex. We generate a random sequence of
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vertices, such that no two successive positions are identical. We then duplicate every
position for a random duration. The duration, the number of successive demands
at that position, is geometrically distributed. We set the parameters such that no
online algorithm can benefit by switching between vertices. On the other hand, given
a sufficiently long duration of repeated demands for the same vertex, the optimal
schedule switches to this vertex.
We now describe the stochastic demand sequence generation. We first generate a
sequence of locations c. We set c1 = i ∈ V uniformly at random. For cτ we set cτ = j
where j ∈ V \ {cτ−1} uniformly. In addition we generate a sequence of duration b
distributed geometrically with parameter p = 1
1+ǫ
. Namely, bτ = j with probability
pj−1p, for j ≥ 1. We are now ready to generate the demand sequence d. For each
cτ = i we associate a unit vector ei which has ei,i = 1 and ei,j = 0 for j 6= i. We
duplicate ecτ exactly bτ times. We truncate the sequence at time T , and this is the
demand sequence d.
First consider an arbitrary online algorithm. We claim that it does not gain (in
expectation) any social welfare by moving supply, and hence it’s expected social
welfare is T/k. The argument is that the cost of moving δ supply to a new location
is (1 + ǫ)δ. On the other hand, the expected duration in the new location is only
1 + ǫ, so in expectation there is no benefit. For an online algorithm that does not
move any supply the expected social welfare is T/k.
We now analyze the social welfare attained by an optimal offline algorithm. The
main benefit of an offline algorithm is that it has access to the realized b = τ . It is
simple to see that if bτ ≥ 2 then the offline algorithm has a benefit of bτ−(1+ǫ) > 0.
E[bτ − (1 + ǫ)|bτ ≥ 2] Pr[bτ ≥ 2] =
∞∑
i=2
(
ǫ
ǫ+ 1
)i−1 · i− 1− ǫ
1 + ǫ
=
ǫ
1 + ǫ
.
We now would like to sum over τ however the numbers summands in the sum is a
random variable. Since we have a random sums of random variables we need to use
Wald’s identity. Since the expected number of summands is T
1+ǫ
and the expectation
of each is ǫ
1+ǫ
we have that the optimal offline algorithm has an expected social
welfare of at least ǫ
(1+ǫ)2
T .
This implies that no algorithm has a competitive ratio better than (1+ǫ)
2
ǫ
1
k
.
5.4.2 Restricted Drift
For any demand sequence d let δ ≤ 1 be the average drift, i.e., ∑t ‖dt − dt−1‖tv =
(1/2)
∑
t ‖dt − dt−1‖1 = δT .
Theorem 5.13. For the case where costs ℓij = 1 for all i 6= j, setting demand and
supply equal (the match algorithm) gives social welfare of (1 − δ)T , and is (1 − δ)-
competitive.
For arbitrary ℓij, where ℓij ≤ ℓmax, the match algorithm has social welfare of at least
(1− δℓmax)T , and is (1− δℓmax)-competitive.
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Proof. Since for ℓij = 1 the earthmover distance metric coincides with the total
variation metric, we have that at time t the social welfare of match is 1 − ‖dt −
st−1‖tv = 1−‖dt−dt−1‖tv since match sets st−1 = dt−1. Summing over all time steps
we get that the social welfare of match is T − δT . Since the social welfare of opt is
at most T we have that match is (1− δ)-competitive.
For a general metric, note that em(dt, dt−1) ≤ ℓmax‖dt − dt−1‖tv. This implies that
the social welfare of match is at least (1 − ℓmaxδ)T , and hence it is (1 − ℓmaxδ)-
competitive.
Theorem 5.14. For the metric ℓij = 1, no online algorithm has a competitive ratio
better (greater) than 1− δ/4.
Proof. Consider the following demand sequence. The demand sequence uses only
the first two locations, i.e., for all locations i 6= 1, 2 and times t we have dti = 0. For
each time t we select the demand randomly from the following distribution.
dt =
{
dt1 = 1, d
t
2 = 0 With probability
1
2
dt1 = 1− 2δ, dt2 = 2δ With probability 12
.
The generated sequence has an expected drift of δT . Any online algorithm ALG
has, in expectation, social welfare of (1 − δ)T . The main point is that opt has a
strictly better expected social welfare.
Consider the online algorithm match as a starting point. Partition the time to T/2
pairs of time slots, [2m − 1, 2m]. Consider the event that d2m−2 = d2m 6= d2m−1.
This event occurs with probability 1/4. In such an event we can modify match and
at time 2m − 1 set s2m−1 = dm. (This requires knowing the future, but we are
interested in opt so it is fine.) Such a modification increases the social welfare by
2δ (lowering the serviced demand by 2δ and lowering the movement costs by 4δ).
Therefore, the expected social welfare is improved by (1/4)(2δ)(T/2). This implies
that the expected social welfare of opt is at least (1− (3/4)δ)T .
This means that no algorithm is more than 1−δ
1−(3/4)δ
-competitive. This implies that
no online algorithm can have a competitive ratio better than (1− δ/4)T .
6 Discussion
Social welfare in our setting depends on the taxicabs and their locations (the supply
s), passengers, their locations and values (the profile P ), and distances between
taxicabs and passengers. In this paper we introduce passenger-taxicab equilibria,
prove their existence and give poly time algorithms for computing surge prices so
as to maximize social welfare.
We have shown that although time series are a critical part of the social welfare gains
of any taxicab provider, no algorithm can hope to achieve significant worst-case
ratios. Thus, in the future different relaxations to the problem might be considered
in order to allow for more adaptive algorithms.
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When computing the surge prices above, we have implicitly assumed that taxicab
locations are known (e.g., via GPS). Contrawise, passengers have no incentive to
misreport their location (trivially) and valuation (as proved above). An interesting
variation on our models would be to consider taxicabs declaring their own distances
to passengers. Those would not be physical distances but rather a personalized cost
for service at a given location.
If such personalized costs are verifiable, and social welfare is redefined as the sum of
passenger values served minus the personalized service costs, then the surge prices
computed in this paper maximize this new social welfare. This allows for more
robust pricing mechanisms which allow us to incorporate issues such as “start up
costs” which are a bonus for drivers to get out of bed.
Taxicab personalized costs are private to the taxicab. Thus, any surge price compu-
tation would have to contend with private values of the taxicabs as well as private
values for the passengers. It is easy to see that without Bayesian assumptions on
the private values, little can be done. Just consider a passenger and a taxicab at
the same location, they need to agree upon a price. In the Bayesian setting this is
called the bilateral trading problem and there is a rich literature on the topic.
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